

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

Staff Analysis of Comments on 9 August 1979 Draft Revision
of DCID 1/11

1. Paragraph 1.a of DCID. NSA wants "minimum" substituted for "uniform." We are convinced that use of the qualifier "minimum" would sanction different policies and procedures within the Community. This could result in either inadequate or excessive security measures within different agencies for shared information of the same level of sensitivity. We believe that standards developed for Community use should take account of specific security requirements for information available to two or more agencies, and then provide for uniformity in its protection. Protection of National Foreign Intelligence available within a single agency would logically be a matter of internal security controls. The current, published version of DCID 1/11 does not use the qualifier "minimum" in the section of identical substantive content. Nothing has come to our attention suggesting that the lack of such qualification has caused any problems for any Community agency. (U)

The qualifier "uniform" was specifically agreed to by Work Group 1 at the March 1979 SECOM seminar. Such was deemed necessary to implement the President's charge to the DCI in E.O. 12036 (section 1-601(i)) to "ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and products" (emphasis added). Since the DCI looks to the Security Committee for staff support on Community security matters, we believe the Committee's charter should reflect the full range of security responsibilities assigned to the DCI. (U)

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500100015-4

2. Footnote two on page 1 of DCID. NSA objects to the term "intelligence information" and to the footnoted definition thereof. Conceptually, only "information" can be protected against unauthorized disclosure. However, since the concept can be dealt with adequately in the footnoted definition, the word "information" in conjunction with "intelligence" need not appear in the text and has been deleted from the new draft. NSA questions the authority of E.O. 12036 definitions vis-a-vis those in the "Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions." Executive Orders take precedence over any other executive branch documents issued at a lower level. E.O. 12036 defines "intelligence" as meaning "foreign intelligence and counterintelligence," both of which terms are themselves defined in the Order. Hence, the footnote defines "intelligence" by including definitions of all its defined parts. In the interests of avoiding possible questions on the definition, we have added the term "intelligence product" (as defined in E.O. 12036) in part a; the word "processing" in part b (to accommodate an Air Force suggestion); and a new part c to encompass other categories of information of security concern which members may not believe are fully subsumed by the other parts of the definition. (U)

3. Paragraph 1.b of DCID.

a. DIA recommends the addition of "compromising emanations" to line 2, on the grounds that TEMPEST matters are a significant threat to security and that the SECOM charter should address them. Emanations security matters are handled within the Community by elements often organizationally separate from those responsible for security. We believe existing assignments of responsibility in this field should remain. (U)

b. NSA recommends that line 6 read "...protection of intelligence documents..."vice"...intelligence information...." E.O. 12036 (section 1-604(b)) makes the DCI responsible for "providing policy, guidance and technical assistance to departments and agencies regarding protection of intelligence information...." (emphasis added) (also see section 1-601(i) of the same Order). The National Security Act of 1947 makes the DCI responsible (50 USC 403(d)(3)) "for protecting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500100015-4

intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Only information can be protected against disclosure. Section 3-403 of E.O. 12065, cited by NSA as precluding a DCI responsibility to protect intelligence information, pertains only to special procedures for the systematic review for declassification of specified classes of intelligence information, and specifies that the DCI must approve all such procedures for matters pertaining to intelligence sources and methods. We do not think that NSA's other citations from that Order offer support for their objection. Section 4-201 gives the DCI sole responsibility for authorizing special access programs for matters pertaining to intelligence sources and methods. Section 5-2 makes it clear that implementation of the overall US Government information security program is a cooperative responsibility. With regard to NSA's recommended substitute word, we note that the protection of documents per se is an archivist function directed towards physical conservation. The SECOM should be responsible for security policies and procedures to protect information in whatever medium it may appear. We believe the DCI needs a single focal point to look to for staff support on the broad range of security policy responsibilities assigned him by statute and Executive Order. Limiting the SECOM to rules and regulations governing marking, wrapping and shipping would deny him that support. (U)

4. Paragraph 1.c of DCID. CIA recommends changing the language bearing on the Committee's responsibilities for foreign disclosure and public release. We have attempted to accommodate that recommendation with appropriately modified language in the latest draft. (U)

5. Paragraph 1.f of DCID. NSA recommends substantial deletions. We agree only that the wording should be changed in the interests of clarity. The new draft reflects such. We believe that section 4-2 of E.O. 12065 should be referenced here to reflect SECOM responsibility for supporting the DCI in the exercise of his duty under the Order for special access programs pertaining to intelligence sources and methods. We further believe that the words "within a framework of administrative simplicity" are a desirable standard against which compartmentation administration procedures can be evaluated. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Paragraph 1.g of DCID. CIA and NSA object to the computer security mission including information "communicated" by computer. The word was added at the request of the Chairman of the Computer Security Subcommittee, who advised that his members were divided on this point. In view of the objections, and in the absence of a strong reason for including this aspect in the mission statement, we believe it best to revert to the existing DCID language. (U)

7. Paragraph 2.a of DCID. NSA wants "minimum" substituted for "uniform" and another change. Our views are expressed under items 1 and 2 above. (U)

8. Paragraph 2.b of DCID. CIA suggests clarification of language bearing on public release. We agree. The draft reflects new language. (U)

A 11
9. Paragraph 2.c of DCID. NSA recommends deletion of entire paragraph. CIA recommends a change to lines 2 and 3. We believe that the first part of this paragraph is essential in order to support the President's charge to the DCI in E.O. 12036 (section 1-601(h)) to "conduct a program to protect against overclassification of foreign intelligence information." We consider that the Security Committee is the proper focal point for staff support, and that it could and should discharge this function through such means as preparation of broad classification guidance for the Community. We agree with NSA on deletion of the classification challenge function. The new draft reflects appropriate changes. (U)

10. Paragraph 3.b of DCID. NSA recommends that the language of the present DCID be retained here. We have made an appropriate modification in the new draft. (U)

11. Attachment 1. In response to suggestions from several members we have paragraph classified this attachment, and have applied other markings required by E.O. 12065. (U)

12. Attachment 1, paragraph 1.i. CIA asks that the word "equipment be added. We have done so. (U)

13. Attachment 2. Army recommends that the title and text of this be changed to use the term "automation security" vice "computer security." We are reluctant to make such a change without the concurrence of the Computer Security Subcommittee. Accordingly, we believe current, accepted usage should be continued. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500100015-4

14. Attachment 2, paragraph 1. CIA and NSA object to the "communicated" aspect of this Subcommittee's mission. We agree. See item 6 above for discussion. (U)

15. Attachment 2, paragraph 3. DIA and Army object to the assignment of responsibility for computer security R&D to both the Computer Security and the R&D Subcommittees. They recommend that it be assigned to the former body. We agree that the existing DCID and the draft version are deficient in making dual tasking, but we believe that all research and development of security concern or applicability should be managed and directed by the R&D Subcommittee. We have modified the draft accordingly, leaving the Computer Security Subcommittee responsible only for recommending R&D programs in their area of concern. (U)

16. Attachment 3, paragraph 1. NSA and CIA recommend that the qualifier "technical" be added before the word "guidance" in line 3. We believe such qualification would be at variance with the DCI's desire for a single focal point to support him in meeting his security responsibilities from the President under E.O. 12036. Section 1-604(b) of that Order tasks the DCI with "providing policy, guidance and technical assistance to departments and agencies regarding protection of intelligence information, including information that may reveal intelligence sources and methods." There is no qualification there on either policy or guidance; only with regard to the "how to" function of assistance once policy and guidance have been provided. We invite attention to the fact that the language of this attachment would have the Security Committee provide "guidance" only towards specified security objectives (in sub-paragraphs a, b and c). We do not believe that the draft can reasonably be interpreted as empowering the Committee to provide policy on what is and what is not to be compartmented. (U)

17. Attachment 3, footnote. NSA asks that footnote 2 from the current version of the DCID be restored. The footnote not only serves no useful purpose but could be interpreted as extending the Committee's authority into areas generally considered to be the responsibility of Executive Agents. The original footnote 2 was added during the 1974 revision of DCID 1/11 at the suggestion of the then Navy member of the Committee to provide a written reminder of the need for

CONFIDENTIAL

18. Attachment 3. In response to members' suggestions, paragraph and overall classification markings have been applied to meet the requirements of E.O. 12065. (U)

19. Attachment 3, paragraph 2. ^{+CIA} NSA recommends the // qualifier "technical" before the word "guidance." See // discussion under item 16 above. (U)

20. Attachment 3, paragraph 2.c. NSA recommends the lead word "information" be replaced by "document." See discussion under item 3.b above. (U)

21. Attachment 3, page 2. (NSA and CIA recommend that // paragraph 3 in the existing version of attachment 3 to this DCID be restored. Work Group 1 at the March 1979 SECOM seminar unanimously agreed that this paragraph should be deleted on the grounds that it has had the unfortunate effect of being interpreted as sanctioning divided security responsibilities in support of the DCI. When the DCI reassigned the Security Committee under new chairmanship in March 1978, he advised the NFIB that the Committee, supported by the Community Security Group, would be responsible for advising him on all matters of Community concern with respect to security policy and management. We believe therefore that the assignment of responsibilities to the DCI under E.O. 12036 and his statement of the assigned role of the Committee are dispositive of the issue of a central focal point for Community security policy and guidance. Thus, the DCID need not contain a statement on technical assistance to other DCI committees, as they should be able to expect the Security Committee to provide them such upon request. Again, members should note that the compartmentation missions and functions enumerated for the Committee in this draft DCID address measures to protect information, and do not empower the Committee to say what shall or shall not be compartmented. (U)

22. Attachment 3, paragraph 5.

a. NSA and CIA recommend adding "in coordination // with the appropriate DCI committee" to the first line. We //

CONFIDENTIAL

consider such language to be superfluous. We believe that any recommendations in this area which were not coordinated with others having a direct interest would be rejected, and properly so. (U)

b. CIA recommends clarification of language bearing on public release. We agree. The draft reflects new language. (U)

23. Attachment 4. DIA and Army recommend that responsibility for computer security R&D be taken away from the R&D Subcommittee and assigned to the Computer Security Subcommittee. See discussion under item 15 above. (U)

24. Attachment 5, footnote. Air Force recommends the definition in the note read: "unauthorized disclosure means the compromise or possible compromise of intelligence information through public media disclosure. In cases involving espionage, the Subcommittee shall provide a damage assessment to the DCI at the conclusion of any investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or when any espionage activity is disclosed." Air Force argues that references to negligence or accident should be deleted as matters to be handled administratively by Community agencies, and that FBI/Subcommittee roles involving espionage need to be clarified. We believe that disclosures of sensitive information are of concern whether they result from negligence or from deliberate intent. We do not believe that the suggested language on investigations is necessary, and we suggest that the draft language, which was specifically agreed to by the Subcommittee, be retained. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL